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Introduction
By showing that state borders can be harbingers of international cooperation, European integration has served 'not to wither away existing constitutional borders' but to promote 'peaceful co-existence' between different member-states (Kaplan and Hakli, 2002; Teague, 1996, p. 565) . One way in which such peaceful co-existence is fostered lies in 'building networks of interdependence and common action' across borders between actors at all levels (Anastasakis and Bojicic-Dzelilovic, 1992) . Such an approach is simultaneously more difficult and more necessary when it comes to contested borders. In a conflict situation, actors in the networks cultivated by European integration play the crucial role of 'mediating' the European ideal of cross-border development, cooperation, and peace. As a locus of a most intense relationship through both violent conflict and peaceful cooperation between two member-states, the Irish border is a remarkable case study of the EU's capacity in this regard. Indeed, EU programmes specifically targeted at conflict resolution on the island have frequently had an explicit cross-border mandate. The purpose of this article is to critique the rationale and effectiveness of this approach through analysing the perspective of the 'mediators' of the European ideal.
The primary data for this research is drawn from interviews with individuals who may be seen to fulfil this mediating function through their roles in implementing EU crossborder programmes in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. This includes politicians, policymakers, and representatives of the community and voluntary sector in Northern Ireland and the southern border counties, most of whom work in the northwest region of Ireland which formed the focal case study for this research. This analysis of the EU's approach to cross-border conflict resolution in Ireland covers four main areas. First, what 'pathways of influence' have been used by the EU and what the conditions of this impact have been (see Diez, Stetter and Albert, 2006) . Secondly, how the EU's role as an external actor is perceived in Ireland/Northern Ireland in light of other international players and factors. Finally, the relationship between cross-border cooperation and local development in a process of conflict resolution. The opinion of key players in the implementation of EU cross-border programmes regarding these three dimensions of the EU's role -conditions, context, and consequences -provides an invaluable insight into the mediation of the European ideal in Ireland.
I. The conditions of the EU's approach
The four pathways of influence for the EU Diez, Stetter and Albert (2006, p. 565 ) define conflict as 'the articulation of the incompatibility of subject positions'; if the European Union is to have influenced the conflict it must have helped to fundamentally change these subject positions. Building on Barnett and Duvall's (2003) categorisation of power types in terms of direct/diffuse power and actors/social relations, Diez et al. (2006, pp. 570-5) contend that there are four 'pathways' through which the EU can impact on border conflicts (see Table 1 below). The first pathway -'compulsory impact' -is the most obvious direct influence the EU has on the political leadership of conflict parties. This can take the form of 'carrot' and 'stick' instruments used to persuade political leaders to engage in a peace process. The second pathway -'enabling impact' -also affects the political leadership in conflicting parties, yet it is not directly applied. The participation of political leaders in the process of European integration can indirectly alter their approach to the conflict.
Crucial here is the institutional and discursive context provided by the EU, including the socialisation of policy-makers. The third pathway -'connective impact' -covers the points at which the EU's institutional and discursive framework is connected to the conflict society. This includes policies and initiatives through which the EU can directly 4 affect social actors and activities in the conflict region, such as through project funding.
The final pathway -'constructive impact' -is defined by Diez et al. (2006, p. 574) as 'the most indirect but-if successful-also most persuasive mode of transformation'. This is the most long-term and ambitious pathway of influence for the EU, given that it principally aims to affect the subject positions involved in a conflict through 'a (re)-construction of identities'. This pathway is thus centrally concerned with the EU's influence on communication and discourse, rather than policies or structures. The validity of each of these pathways to the Irish case is considered below. 
No compulsory impact for the EU in Ireland
Despite the fact that interviews were conducted with individuals who have had regular direct contact with the European Union (mainly through the Commission, specifically DG Regional Policy), none of the interviewees identified the 'compulsory impact' of the EU as a significant factor in the Irish case. This supports other evidence that it has not been a policy of the EU to directly influence political leadership in relation to the peace process. This is partly because the compulsory power of the EU is most effective prior to membership (a fact borne out in the case of the EU's approach to Greek-Turkish relations [Rumelili, 2004] ), and neither government considered it directly relevant to the Troubles when the UK and Ireland joined in 1973. Moreover, the EU did not attempt to make any direct stand on the conflict until the European Parliament Committee's 5
Haagerup Report on the situation in Northern Ireland in March 1984. Describing the situation as one of two 'conflicting national identities', Haagerup (1984, p. 7) recognised the limitations of the EU's capacity to effect change in this regard and consequently recommended a supportive rather than proactive role for the EU, i.e. one which endorsed the peaceful measures taken by the British government and (he urges)
by the British and Irish governments together. 1 Yet soon after this, in October 1984, the Parliament was the locus of one of the EU's strongest attempts to force a core actor to engage in desecuritising moves in Northern Ireland, when it voted in favour of a motion calling on the British government to ban the use of plastic bullets. However, the lack of 'compulsory' power behind this action was aggravated by the fact that, within days of the Parliament passing this motion, the European Commission on Human Rights (which had been the focus of international intervention in the conflict up to this point) found that the use of plastic bullets in a rioting situation is justified. More common has been the use of special EU funds as a 'carrot' to encourage cooperation between parties to the peace process, exemplified in Commission President Delors' announcement of funding packages after the first ceasefires in 1994. Any power that this has on political leaders is, however, indirect given that the ones who are most affected by such funds are neither political leaders nor paramilitaries but community-level actors, as discussed below.
The enabling impact of the EU in Ireland
Ultimately, the influence of the EU on political leaders in relation to the conflict in Northern Ireland has been most significant and effective in indirect, structural forms arising from EU membership. The first of the three main ways in which the EU has been seen to have an 'enabling impact' on the conflict in Ireland is the broadest, namely programmes [and] a pan-European network'. 10 However, a noteworthy weakness of the enabling impact is the fact that few voters would know of (or, indeed, be given much information about) the varied and subtle influence of the EU at this level. In this particular study, it was only the elite-level interviewees (politicians, policy-makers) themselves who even mentioned any aspect of the enabling impact of the EU. The lack of public awareness of the EU's role is discussed in the next two sections regarding the societal impact of the EU.
The connective impact of the EU in Ireland
The most widely recognised and obvious pathway of the EU's influence in relation to the conflict in Ireland is the connective impact. Every interviewee explicitly acknowledges the importance of this pathway and its broadly positive influence on the conflict in Northern Ireland. Of all the interviewees, only the politicians identify the Single Market as having a direct effect on the pertinence of the Irish border for the conflict:
The European Union is now a single market and, as I say, if you look at the border in Ireland now, if you drive across the border there's no stopping, so in that sense, physical borders all over Europe have gone, not just in Ireland.
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The funding given by the EU to community groups in Northern Ireland and the border counties is, however, much more widely considered important due to its direct impact at grassroots level and its implications for peace-building. 12 The specific implications of this funding are outlined in later sections, yet it is worth noting here that the connective impact of the EU through community funding is seen as having a directly positive influence towards conflict resolution. Agreement may be seen as the clearest evidence for the constructive impact of the EU.
It also points to the central role played by local conditions and actors in determining the effectiveness of the pathways of influence for the EU in any particular context. Diez et al. (2006, pp. 587-9) acknowledge that the form and success of the EU's impact on a conflict is influenced by the structural environment of the conflict and the relationship between the EU and actors within the conflict setting. The research performed in this case study to date suggests that these local conditions do not merely 'influence' the impact of the EU but actually serve to determine it. This is exacerbated by the fact that the EU is itself far from an homogenous actor but rather a complex set 16 relationship between European integration and its constituent parts. The context of the EU enabled unionist to agree to the cross-border bodies as economically rational rather than politically significant, now these bodies facilitate a greater influence for the EU north and south. The influence of the EU is thus clearly mediated through, and restricted by, the conditions of local politics. This suggests that the EU is not so much an independent force for conflict resolution but rather that its main role is to build upon and facilitate further change within the conflict society.
EU's impact conditioned by local politics

II. The context for the EU's approach
The EU: material benefactor not peace-maker Popular perception of the European Union in Northern Ireland and the border counties bears out the finding that the EU is at best a facilitating (as opposed to driving) force for conflict resolution. For a start, the EU is rarely directly associated in people's minds with either conflict resolution or with cross-border relations. One interviewee suggests that the connective impact of the EU is limited to non-governmental organisations simply because they are the only ones aware of the EU's role at community level.
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Ignorance of the EU's activity persists despite the requirements to advertise receipt of EU funding and the willingness of those involved to acknowledge the importance of these funds ('we try to advertise the EU dimensions as much as possible'). 35 'People assume we're going to get money on the basis that we're a border region with Objective One status etc. but I don't know if they really associate that with cross-border the EU as a material benefactor rather than a peace-maker may be seen as one of its most unique and positive assets. As one interviewee in Derry notes, the development focus of the EU enables it to be accepted as a key player in the otherwise controversial area of cross-border relations:
Looking at what we have here, the EU has had a direct impact. People may not be aware of the extent of its reach partly because it has been seen as nonthreatening… Cross-border cooperation was a product or by-product [of economic development], therefore it was natural as opposed to staged.
36
The fact that the EU is '"expected" to support Irish infrastructure' gives it a passport to peace-building through economic development. 37 This subtle influence of the EU stands in contrast to the role of other external actors in relation to the conflict, most particularly the USA which is recognised as 'winning the publicity stakes' in this regard.
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The EU in comparison to the US Every time you switched on the TV it always seemed that it is America that is trying to solve the conflict in Ireland.
39
The high profile role played by the United States in the peace process in Ireland, particularly during the 1990s, stands in such contrast to the European Union's role because it is, first and foremost, a very different type of actor. The story of the role of the US in the peace process is primarily that of key individual political figures. Ireland'. 41 The EU may not be an homogenous actor, but its identity is collective and defined more by institutions than individuals. This means that it lacks the mediafriendly face of US politicians and the 'natural interest in Ireland' stimulated by Irish-
Americans. Yet these features bring with them certain risks, and, as one interviewee (who wished this comment to be anonymous) notes, the impact of the US on the conflict has not always been constructive ('Noraid', for example), and many unionists view US politicians attempting to appeal to an Irish-American electorate with a certain degree of suspicion. Funding sources other than the EU are important because they can be easier to access 
The wider international dimension to conflict resolution
III. The consequences of the EU's approach
Progress in cross-border relations
One area of substantial and ongoing change in Ireland is that of cross-border relations.
At an individual level, the reduction in violence in Northern Ireland as a result of the peace process means that a wider range of people in the south are more confident in crossing the border. 45 With regard to economic and political cooperation, the European Inter-Trade Ireland or Waterways Ireland), the SEUPB has very broad parameters. This is reflected in the comments of a then-Director of the SEUPB, who described the Body's work as being, 'not for geography but for the benefit of people in the area by encouraging economic activity'. 48 Yet if this vagueness makes it unique among the Strand Two institutions, it does bear resemblance to the rationale of a range of other cross-border bodies whose work has been significantly bolstered and formalised through the requirements of EU programmes (now managed by the SEUPB). This includes the NWRCBG, which has seen its foundational principle -that 'physically advancing the region and its profile etc. all creates a stability which goes towards creating peace and enhancing it' -given legitimacy and material resources through the SEUPB. 49 Elite-level interviewees place a distinct emphasis on the economic dimension, arguing that 'on cross-border relations, if we put the infrastructure there… people will use it'. 50 passengers in its first fifteen months of business. 51 The belief that 'conflict resolution happens in tandem with economic and social development activity' has underpinned the approach of many policy-makers and politicians to cross-border relations.
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Reconciliation is almost a by-product of what we do, it has never been a conscious statement. In fact, that may well be why conflict resolution has been a successful by-product of our activity, because it is not the focus or aim.
53
A primary emphasis on economic gain is viewed (particularly by the elites) as being fundamental to the success of cross-border activity in Ireland. This reinforces the point made above, namely that the EU's greatest asset as an influence on the conflict is its economic credentials.
The EU ideal: development, cooperation and peace
The EU, therefore, may be viewed as a successful and significant actor in relation to cross-border relations in Ireland. Questions remain, however, as to how cross-border relations relate to and affect the conflict itself. The EU has conceived of the conflict in essentially binary terms: British/Unionist/Protestant and Irish/Nationalist/Catholic. This dualist conception of the conflict lies at the heart of the 1998 Agreement, hence its three 'strands' of British-Irish, north-south and unionist-nationalist cooperation. According to this approach, the conflict is not fundamentally about religion or ideology or class, it is about the contested sovereignty over the island of Ireland. 24 subordination, through an identity conflict, to a conflict about issues articulated through political debate. The assumption here is that interests on both sides can be best met through cooperation, and that cooperation increases mutual understanding.
Development, cooperation and peace are thus tied together in the 'European ideal' and, specifically, in the EU's approach to borders. This is seen in the two major programmes of the EU relating to cross-border relations in Ireland, namely PEACE and INTERREG. urban and rural regeneration, development of cross-border co-operation and extending social inclusion (ADM/CPA, 2000, p. iv).
Hence, the EU's approach to the conflict in Ireland/Northern Ireland stands or falls on the strength of its core assumption: cross-border cooperation is fundamental to economic development, and both are fundamental to the achievement of peace. A criticism made by Harvey in a report on PEACE I is valid here:
The links between peace and reconciliation, community development, community relations and economic development were ambiguities buried deep in this Programme from the very start and remain unresolved. (Harvey, 1997 , quoted in McDonald, 2000 .
Assessing the integrity of the development/cooperation/peace nexus is a task that lies beyond the immediate requirements of this particular article. Nonetheless, the evidence produced by this research project suggests that the ambiguities that Harvey refers to do have consequences for the practical implementation and success of the EU programmes in Ireland.
Conclusions
The most significant realm of direct action for the EU regarding the conflict in Ireland has been in cross-border relations. Its role in this area has been facilitated by its credentials as a powerful, and neutral, economic actor or, more specifically, material benefactor. Thus, the indirect 'enabling' influence of the EU on the elite and the direct 'connective' impact of the EU on the conflict society through EU cross-border programmes are broadly recognised as the chief pathways of influence for the EU in the conflict. By funding projects in the community sector as well as in the private and public sectors, the EU has become a major stimulant for community development on both sides of the border. For many see long-term reconciliation as coming from building relations 'not between individuals but between communities', and will argue that 'community development and peacebuilding are the same thing '. 57 This fits in well with the EU's own approach to the conflict, which is to view it as a conflict of identities that needs to move to a non-violent debate around practical issues:
Bringing different communities together -permanently ending conflict -is the very essence of what the European Union stands for. (Santer, CEC President 1995 -1999 , quoted in McDonald,2000 ).
However, this study has shown that the EU is a long way from having the 'constructive'
influence that would enable a permanent and irreversible transformation of the conflict situation. This is essentially because the EU is not an independent force for change but its influence is mediated by local actors and is vulnerable to local conditions. Crossborder trade and partnership have been a good 'trial run' for EU-fostered networks and programmes because they are seen as having clear, beneficial and neutral ends (i.e. economic development). When it comes to more subtle, normative community-level work, however, the EU's lack of independence becomes much more of a liability. The fact that even those who work full-time in EU-funded cross-border and crosscommunity programmes view the EU as more of a 'cash cow' than a 'peace-maker'
indicates the futility of waiting for peace through 'Europeanisation'. Instead, we are drawn to acknowledge the crucial role of these 'mediators' and to take encouragement from the gradual development of this role through the EU's wider impact on contemporary policy-making and practice. This impact is (in ideal terms) tending towards cooperation that is multilevel, multi-sectoral, self-perpetuating, changeinducing and, furthermore, based on 'common interests' beyond purely economic gain. 57 Interviews with youth workers in St. Johnston and Ballintra/Laghey, 6 May 2004.
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The impetus and opportunity for putting such cooperation into practice increasingly lies in the hands of the local 'mediators' and not of the European decision-makers. This could well be the principal validation of an EU role in conflict resolution through crossborder cooperation.
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